In this paper, we challenge the widely accepted approach where a first responder does not capture the RAM of a computer system if found to be powered off at a crime scene. We investigate the presence of confidential data in RAM such as user passwords. Our findings show that even if the computer is switched off but not removed from the mains, the data are preserved. In fact, when a process is terminated but the computer is still operating, the respective data are more likely to be lost. Therefore, capturing the memory could be as critical on a switched off system as on a running one.
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Introduction
Forensic analysis of volatile memory is a rapidly developing topic in the recent years (van Baar et al., 2008) . The need to capture and analyse the RAM contents of a suspect PC grows constantly as remote and distributed applications have become popular, and RAM is an important source of evidence (Gavitt, 2008) containing network traces (Adlestein, 2006) and unencrypted passwords. Occasionally, physical memory can also store data even from the Windows Registry which contains sensitive information like encryption keys (Gavitt, 2008) , information that can be vital for password extraction. However, the RAM is captured only when the computer is switched on; in the opposite case, the first responder would typically seize the hard disk and other non-volatile media which are further examined according to a dead forensic analysis process. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to investigate the robustness and reliability of a method of examining RAM data of a system even when turning it off. The second aim is to investigate the feasibility of obtaining sensitive data such as unencrypted passwords from a practical perspective. In order to meet the first aim, we introduced two definitions that will assist on structuring and studying the underlying problems. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the dynamics of seizing volatile memory are presented. In Section 3, the approach for capturing and extracting passwords and cryptographic keys is presented. In Section 4, we consolidate the findings and propose a memory acquisition process. Finally, in Section 5, we present the concluding remarks.
A measure of volatility
Random access memory is a type of volatile memory, which essentially means that in principle data cannot be stored for the long-term. However, it has been demonstrated that even after power has been switched off, a portion of the data stored in memory can still be retrieved. Back in 1996 (Gutmann, 1996) , researchers acknowledged that both SRAM and DRAM can maintain data, for different reasons each, even after the computer's shutting down. This is mainly due to limitations imposed by the technologies used in semiconductor devices (Gutmann, 2001) . Even though RAM architecture and technology has gravely advanced since, traces of data still remain in memory modules even when idle, and can be retrieved by forensic investigators or malignant attackers.
The observation that the computer's volatile memory can maintain content for certain seconds even minutes after shut down of power supply, was recently confirmed by a team of researchers from the University of Princeton (Halderman et al., 2008) . It was demonstrated that with the use of a bottle of compressed air one could freeze the memory and maintain its contents intact for up to hours. This indicates that confidential data such as cryptographic keys can be exposed. Previous research has shown that this vulnerability can be exploited in order to access information that can be of grave importance in forensic investigations such as encryption keys, passwords or even records of a computer's history. In order to achieve such task, forensics ought to follow certain protocols to avoid data corruption through possible data overwrites or even in rare cases from memory flushing.
Flushing memory is an expensive operation and not favoured by operating systems developers. Non-surprisingly, there is no correlation between the operating systems and preservation of RAM contents. The latter depends solely on the hardware and whether the computer system is connected to the mains when switched off.
On the other hand, the most commonly used Windows Operational Systems tend to forcefully copy data from the hard disk drive to the system memory -a procedure called memory caching. If that data can be retrieved from the memory, even after the computer is switched off, it could lead the forensics team to useful conclusions as to how that particular data had been used by and processed by the system (van Baar et al., 2008) .
In addition, it is well known that most operating systems tend to overwrite entries in memory when performing a cold boot, a case in which the computer is turned on. This fact highlights the need to avoid powering up the computer, unless precautions are taken in order to maximise the amount of information that can be extracted from the volatile memory. Usually, the loss of data comes as a result of BIOS executable code performing tests or analysis on most hardware, which leads to an overwrite of information in RAM. On the other hand, when computers perform warm boots, which is when an operating computer restarts, no such loss of data occurs. Needless to say, when a forensics team has to examine a computer, they ought to take that knowledge into account. Actually that is a focal point for many researchers as they try to take advantage of the preservation of data during warm restarts. For example, a tool called bootjacker (Chan et al., 2008) forces restarts as a way to retrieve data from the memory and is effective mainly when a computer is found on, but even if processes are terminated. Bootjacker and other tools can be used even if the computer is shut off but a custom bootloader (Chan et al., 2008) or a custom kernel (Halderman et al., 2008 ) is required in order to prevent data corruption in the RAM.
Definition 1:
Complete volatile memory loss is the state of memory where it is not possible to distinguish, for any memory address location, whether the stored value is a result from some past system or user activity.
The above definition refers to the complete 'erasure' of the activities in a system -from a volatile memory perspective. Here, erasure does not necessarily require that all values are zeroed out; in fact, we are interested in the ability to distinguish whether a particular bit stored in memory was part of a particular process activity. We have to keep in mind that RAM cells cannot preserve data for long unless power supply is constant, allowing each cells capacitors to periodically refresh their charge. In any other case, the aforementioned erasure occurs. This process also known as memory remanence. Depending on the context of the forensic investigation, the different types of data may have a different weight in terms of forensic value. For example, in malware forensics, the data containing the execution commands of the binary will surely be of some interest since these will be used to extract the malware signature and footprint to be incorporated in an antivirus solution. In contrast, when investigating user activities -say downloading illicit material -the focus would be on the data area of the process. Nonetheless, the need to secure the integrity of the data remains, and therefore in a complete volatile memory loss state any data recovered would not be admissible.
However, as in most digital forensics cases it suffices to recover portions of data that are capable of proving or refuting a hypothesis therefore even if parts of the memory are valid they may contain the 'smoking gun' evidence, or other pieces of data that may support an investigation such as passwords and encryption keys.
Definition 2: Partial volatile memory loss is the state of memory where for m > 0 memory address positions their stored values can be correlated with past system or user activity.
It can be claimed that when t = t shutdown (the moment of deactivation of the computer) we have partial memory loss, whereas in time t = t shutdown + t off with t off → ∞ we have total memory loss. The rate of memory loss depends on the technology of the memory and may also depend upon external conditions (such as temperature). In DDR type RAM there is no memory loss if the computer is switched off but connected to mains. This means that a first responder should enrich the widely accepted procedure of removing and making a bit-stream copy of a hard disk as follows.
Forensic acquisition process
System conditions: Computer is switched off and plugged into mains.
1 Remove power from all hard disks.
2 Connect/replace a DVD/CDROM with a liveCD containing msramdmp or equivalent tool.
3. Connect a forensically prepared USB stick to store the image.
4 Power on the PC and configure the BIOS to boot from CD.
5 Reset the PC and acquire the image.
It is recommended that a liveCD is used instead of a liveUSB as the former is more widespread among systems and therefore it is a safer option. Another issue to keep in mind is that even when a computer is still active and processes have not been terminated, retrieving data from the computer and creating a memory dump are delicate procedures and certain rules have to be followed. Meddling with data and performing even simple operations like logging in can interfere with other data and even delete them (Adlestein, 2006) . In addition, the creation of a memory dump is time consuming and during that time data can be overwritten. So it is easily understood that when a computer has been turned off or processes have been terminated, new and additional rules have to be followed making forensics even harder. For example, it is crucial that memory dumps are created as soon as possible since data in the volatile memory will not be preserved for long and an application of cooling techniques or even the aforementioned method of freezing the memory are not always applicable.
In previous work, it was shown that data remains in physical RAM for a few seconds or even minutes depending on environmental factors, and that time period can be used to retrieve data or even exploit system vulnerabilities. For example, a login password, stored in RAM even for a small period after system shutdown, could be retrieved by rebooting the system while using a custom kernel, or by the moving memory modules into another computer ready to copy all data stored in them (Halderman et al., 2008) .
We performed a memory dump in a very common scenario, where a user accesses Facebook, Gmail, MSN and Skype. There were dumps performed straight after closing the application, after 5, 15 and 60 minutes. The results are presented in Figure 1 . The charts depict references to application data over time. An interesting observation is that the references are not necessarily monotonically decreasing upon the termination of the respective process. This is due to the memory management operations, virtual memory and swapping as implemented by the underlying operating system. Therefore, although a user may have terminated a process, the information is not necessarily lost; terminating a process most likely will lead to the termination of its corresponding file handlers, all the data may still be intact. The problem is that the structure of the original file cannot be reproduced since the pointers that show the mapping files are no longer valid. Nevertheless, new forensic tools can provide solutions by using advanced algorithms like carving algorithms (van Baar et al., 2008) . These algorithms can 'repair' and recover files found in memory without the need for handlers, metadata and pointers. Instead they rely only on the actual data and attempt to reconstruct them (Garfinkel, 2007) . In any case, even if the context of a file cannot be accessed or retrieved, information regarding the date in which the file was created and lastly modified, can provide insight on how that particular file was used (Adlestein, 2006) .
An interesting fact is that in the event that the user shuts down the computer it can be seen that the sooner the computer is shut down (after closing the application in question), the more data are preserved. In addition, during a forensic investigation, the population of the hits can be used to offer an estimate as to how long ago a process was terminated. This estimate can be improved by augmenting the proposed approach with other methods establishing the user activity in the system (Carrier and Spafford, 2006) . For example, as previously proposed in Carrier and Spafford (2006) , with a set of tools and models, an analyst can have an insight on the computer's history and it is user's past actions, by following a particular procedure including observation of data found in RAM (but not limited to it), formulation of hypothesis, prediction over the possible past events that occurred in the computer and finally testing the predictions, for example, through simulations on another computer.
Since in many cases (as shown in Halderman et al., 2008) , passwords and cryptographic keys are stored in memory, advanced methods and algorithms applied on the DRAM can help recover even partially 'erased' keys relating to important processes like login passwords and keys required and used by SSL web servers.
However, as shown in Figure 2 the presence of passwords when visiting a web application (in our case Facebook), is less predictable. As expected after 60 minutes of logging out of the application and terminating the browser, the number of password copies drops, but surprisingly there is an increment after 15 minutes of logging out. 
Password discovery
The images described in Section 2 were examined for passwords. It is highlighted that the corresponding applications were terminated prior to performing a memory image dump. This was done in order to cover the case of the computer being switched off or the user terminating the process as in the opposite case -that is when the process is active -all userspace data as well as metadata can be unambiguously identified through memory analysis tools such as the Volatility Framework (Volatile Systems, 2011). Usually, these tools can identify running processes in the physical memory and network connections. Additionally, they can even extract executables from the memory. Nevertheless, these tools are only able to retrieve information when the system is working and processes are still running.
To assist the analysis, we developed a simple tool that combines strings, egrep and bgrep to search for patterns primarily as regular expressions in a memory dump image. The syntax of the tool is totalrecall.sh < image_file > < pattern_file > where image_file is the memory dump image and pattern_file is the file containing the regular expressions or hex patterns for the strings and binary search respectively. Our findings are summarised and categorised in Table 1 . From the above, we can conclude that volatile memory loses data under certain conditions and in a forensic investigation such memory can be a valuable source of evidence.
Proposed framework for password recovery from volatile memory
The National Institute of Justice special report on Electronic Crime Scene Investigation describes in a form of a flow chart [NIJ, (2008) , p.8] a digital evidence collection process. In the case of a powered off computer, the responder is instructed quite correctly not to turn the computer on. However, the following step instructs to remove the power cord from the back of the computer and connected devices. According to our findings, this step should not always be followed but a RAM capture should be performed instead. However, if the computer was not connected to the mains, this step can be omitted. In any case if the responder is in doubt, the recommendation is to capture the volatile memory. Besides, the process is not particularly time consuming and as such will not add any significant overheads in the over crime scene management operations.
In Figure 3 , we present a volatile memory acquisition process for a first responder. The process favours memory acquisition even when the possibility of complete memory loss is high. This is mainly for covering the case of a suspect user pulling the plug upon police entering the scene. Ideally, the first responder team should have a portable UPS device to minimise the risk of unavailable power supply. The proposed process was designed with a view to allow the application of ACPO Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence (ACPO, 2008) . More specifically, the proposed process aims to preserve the data (ACPO principle 1) which are considered to be volatile. In the event of uncorrupted memory dump, the forensic analyst will be able to apply popular memory analysis tools, such as the volatility framework. Any modification of the memory during acquisition will be documented and supported by the responsible first responder (ACPO principle 2). ACPO principle 3 can be trivially met, as long as there is a log for every step of the analysis process on the memory image. Obviously, this principle applies only after the acquisition due to the volatility nature of RAM.
Conclusions and outlook
Against conventional forensic acquisition recommendations, we argue that capturing memory should be performed even when a computer is found to be switched off at a crime scene. This is because memory is not flushed during a system shutdown as this is an expensive and unnecessary operation which is avoided. In addition, if the computer is connected to the mains, most of the data are preserved. The position that volatile memory should be considered as an unreliable means of storage when the computing system is switched off is of course valid. However, from a forensic perspective such a coarse consideration is not sufficient. Therefore, we have introduced two finer grained definitions of volatile memory loss, offering a more suitable representation of the forensic value of the memory. Provided that every case is distinct, the primary data gathered in the paper are relatively limited in scope as they were used as a proof of concept to develop the forensic process and submit the recommendation of conducting a memory dump of a switched off computer. Although that it is generally recommended that a memory dump should be performed, it is the first responder's judgment as to whether the memory is examined. As such, the process described in this paper could be further refined to capture more hardware configurations and system states (systems with unified extensible firmware interface, UEFI instead of BIOS for example).
Another well known issue reinstated by this research is the importance of security considerations that need to be adopted by the application developers. Firefox, for instance, does not protect the sensitive password values. A possible solution could be to erase (zero out) any memory address spaces associated with HTML password type variables. Although these are expected to be protected during transit (through SSL) and they have to be in plaintext in RAM, they can be more ephemeral and be deleted as long as they are not required. Apart from the legitimate needs of a forensic examiner, many organisations have been affected nowadays from advanced persistent threats (APTs) and a malware can trivially perform a RAM dump straight after infecting a computer to speed up the harvesting of passwords.
Lastly, as part of ongoing and applied research a knowledge of different types of RAM chips and motherboard combinations should be developed in order to capture the volatility measurements, as data persistence in memory depends upon the hardware.
